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First Section 
1. Prelude of the Study 
1.1) The Research Problem 
 
In banking environment, competition and efficiency could be considered, in many 
ways, two side of the same coin. 
In banking industry, competition threat leads to a few remarkable points about its 
peculiar effects. 
Competition has a very damaging side effect if banks pay more attention and 
dedicate more resources to their core area of loans and deposits. In order to compete 
for their business, banks must lower loan rates and, or alternatively, raise deposit 
rates, and, in so doing, negatively influence their margin and profitability. Lower 
profit, naturally, reduces equity value and lower equity value imperils the bank when 
the economy is on a down. Either that, or the bank increases leverage to boost return 
on equity to offset the fall in margin, and excessive leverage imperils the bank. 
Since banks get into trouble, the taxpayer is then called on to bail the banks out. 
More capital, therefore, ought not to be necessarily the answer, as investors will 
desert the industry if returns are too low, which will reduce competition. Moreover, 
if banks are required to raise equity capital at a price higher than the interest rate on 
deposits, an increase in capital requirements may discourage banks willingness to 
screen borrowers and lend (Thakor, 1996; Gorton and Winton, 2000). In so doing, 
banks need to restore their risk appetite, having spent several years preferring to 
build their capital buffers rather than lending to risky small businesses.1 
Competition is a threat to stability, this applies to any economic context, as it is the 
fear of being left behind by competitors and going broke that drives businesses to 
survive, innovate and thrive. 
                                           
1 Speech by Vitor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the 2nd Frankfurt Conference on 
Financial Market Policy: “Banking Beyond Banks, organised by the SAFE Policy Center of Goethe 
University”, Frankfurt am Main, 17 October 2014. 
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The main difference is that, unlike almost any other industry sectors, when a bank 
goes bust there is a sort of systemic implication. In contrast, the impact of an 
industrial company going bust is largely limited to those directly involved. 
On the other hand, a general consensus in the academic literature relies on the 
benefits of financial liberalization. Particularly, the latter motivates competition and 
promotes economic growth (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). In addition, the impact of deregulation on bank efficiency is still inconclusive 
(Deng et al., 2014). Although prudential regulation is primarily designed to 
strengthen systemic stability and improve the function of banking markets, there is a 
lively debate about the effects of regulatory policies on financial intermediation. A 
recent and increasing interest in evaluating the impact of prudential regulation of 
banks on efficiency shows mixed conclusions. In particular, there is remarkable 
evidence indicating that the current regulatory and supervisory frameworks hamper 
the efficient operation of banks (Chortareas et al., 2012). 
Moreover, banking has the peculiarity that its product is a commodity, i.e., money, 
leading to a price competition. Therefore, within this framework, an authentic 
innovation is quite impossible with a commodity, and most banking “innovation” 
simply turn one type of risk into another, obscuring reality in the process. As a result, 
competition must either reduce margins or lead to risk transformation, both of which 
imperil the system. 
“Lest we forget, the crisis of 2008 was preceded by inadequate margins, risk 
transformation and leverage.”2 
The condicio sine qua non banking industry is stable and profitable relying on the 
need to have appropriate margins, which means, in some sense, the need to have 
limited competition. The alternative, the legislation could keep banks small and 
“modest” and restricting their interconnections, limiting, therefore, the impact of 
failure, or to move to some form of mutual fund banking model. Within such a 
banking environment, it is possible to have stability or competition, but not both. 
The financial crisis has shown the drawbacks of over-reliance on a bank-centred 
lending model. In such an environment, there is the need to find new ways to channel 
non-bank finance to businesses and infrastructure projects, which will require big 
                                           
2 “In banking, too much competition is as bad as too little”, Financial Times, 22nd July, 2014. 
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changes to Europe’s market plumbing and policy makers’ approach markets. These 
reasons lead to urgent action which needs to be taken to turn the slogan of capital 
markets union into a workable programme of initiatives.3 
1.2) The Purpose of the Study 
 
In the last decade, the Italian economic environment has undergone, albeit keeping 
intact its main underlying characteristics, a deep evolution with respect to the 
relations and the interactions among financial and economic agents. 
Among the economic agents, it becomes interesting to broaden out the analysis to the 
role played by the financial intermediaries during the crisis, interpreting the latter 
with respect to its double perspective, i.e., analysing firstly the financial aspect, and 
afterwards, investigating the economic and social aspect. 
Within this framework, the role played by the financial intermediaries, during the 
crisis and how they could contribute to the economic growth, is analysed through the 
following research questions: 
 
1. with respect to the Italian banking system, what proxies could explain the 
impact of the financial crisis on it, and how the Italian banks (considering: 
commercial, cooperative and mutual banks) have stood up to it, analysing 
how a shock originating in the banking system could have an effect on the 
real economic growth? 
2. ways of capturing the “intangible relationship” between the banking system 
and the real economy, and how, despite the financial crisis, the Italian 
banking system has contributed to the economic growth investigating 
moreover, which types of banks have shown a more strong and sustainable 
relationship with the economic and social Italian environment? 
 
Moreover, the financial crisis has shed light on a twofold pivotal role played by 
governance and internal audit inside financial intermediaries. The lack of them could 
                                           
3 “Bank stress tests need to be catalyst for policy shifts in Europe”, Financial Times, 23rd October, 
2014. 
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compromise banks’ prudential soundness and financial stability in the financial 
markets. In keeping this picture, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has 
submitted to the G20 (along their 2009 Pittsburgh summit) some key elements 
regarding the resilience of banks and the global banking system. The Committee has 
emphasised both the depth and severity of the crisis, which has been amplified by 
weaknesses in the banking sector and the interconnectedness of systemically 
important financial institutions. 
This advice spurs the necessity to intensify and to investigate the resources that 
banks devote to monitoring risk activity, in order to increase their risk awareness 
related both to their businesses and to structured credit products. 
Furthermore, the crisis has also highlighted the insufficient attention to risk 
management structures, such as a dedicated risk committee and the little financial 
industry experience belonging to the board directors as well. On the reasoning, so far 
outlined, the research aims, in addition, to: 
 
1. estimate bank’s monitoring ability for the Italian banking system (composed 
of commercial, cooperative and mutual banks) as proxy for its monitoring 
effort through fixed-effects regressions; 
2. test the influence of the bank’s monitoring ability on loans quality and its 
predictive aptitude in finding out anticipatory signals of  credit quality 
worsening; 
3. analyse, through the stochastic frontier approach, whether bank’s monitoring 
ability and effort are efficient both for the entire Italian banking system and 
for each type of bank; 
4. analyse the relationship between the effective system of banking supervision, 
i.e. expressed in terms of economic sanctions inflicted by the Bank of Italy, 
and the efficiency of bank production process estimated through the 
stochastic frontier approach. 
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1.3) The Importance of the Study 
 
The originality and the importance of this study rely both on the role played by 
banker/bank employee in loan monitoring and to their in-depth knowledge of 
customer information. Secondly, the empirical analyses conducted aim to shed light 
on the “time-consuming” process (Rose, 2002) along which the loans monitoring 
activity is conventionally considered. An “ex-ante” loan to customer assessment4 
will be carried out as an attempt at the early detection of problem loans, any further 
deterioration and severe losses. The analysis aims to argue, that a more robust 
monitoring activity ought to emphasise its economic benefits rather than the cost 
estimates and its valuable contribution both to the financial system and to real 
economy. 
The contribution of the current research relies on the possibility to introduce an “ex-
ante” proxy of monitoring effort based on the resources that a bank devotes to loan 
screening and monitoring (in terms of labour input into the monitoring process). The 
total amount of resources, which a bank devotes to monitoring its loans customer, is 
not reported in the income statement. Besides occupying a remarkable place in the 
academic literature (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986; Rajan, 1992; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
1995), bank monitoring is one of the main sources of value creation. 
This new perspective aims to overcome the “ex-post” monitoring process (as 
suggested by Coleman et al., 2006), widely adopted in literature such as: credit rating 
representing the market’s assessment of the lenders (Billett et al., 1995), loan loss 
provisions and client firm size (Johnson, 1997), lender’s credit rating and its size 
(Cook et al., 2003). A further contribution concerns the data collected (Italian banks) 
so far not considered by other research. In particular, the sample is composed of 436 
different kinds of banks (most of them not publicly traded) belonging to the Italian 
banking system during the time period 2000-2012 and split up into 68 commercial 
banks, 25 cooperative banks and 343 mutual banks. 
The current work could contribute to the existing literature since other empirical 
research, involving the monitoring effort, has not considered, as sample of analysis, 
                                           
4 In accordance with Coleman et al. (2006). 
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the Italian banking system. Moreover, the importance of investigating the Italian 
banking system could also rest, first of all, on its ability to have weathered the 
financial crisis and turbulence better than many others (Draghi, 2009), and secondly, 
with respect to its determinant structure as bank – based economy, in which the 
existence of interbank customer relationship are likely to matter and they become 
interesting to study (Affinito 2012). On other crucial aspect is related both to the 
guidelines emphasised in the qualitative analysis impact conducted by the Bank of 
Italy5 and, to some revisions enforced in the Circolare n. 263 of Bank of Italy6. 
1.4) The Scope of the Study 
 
The current research emphasises a twofold perspective. The first one aims to shed 
light on the role and skills of banker/bank employee, already stressed, in some sense, 
by Schumpeter (1939): “for the functioning of the system it is important that the 
banker should know what credit is used for… the banker must not only know what 
the transaction is which he is asked to finance, but he must also know the customer, 
his business and even his private habits…”. The second perspective, instead, relies 
on the “incomplete” (under improvement) bank monitoring proxy. Incompleteness 
related to the preliminary estimates, the latter constantly under improvement to study 
in depth the characteristics of the Italian banking system. 
1.5) Outline of the Study 
 
The current study is set up as follows: chapter n. 1 analyses the contribution of the 
Italian Banking System to the Italian Economic and Social Growth by implementing 
a new econometric measure called Banking Granular Residual; chapter n. 2 contains 
the research questions together with the main hypotheses with which the loan 
                                           
5 “Qualitative Impact Analysis”, Bank of Italy, Disposizioni di vigilanza prudenziale per le banche in 
materia di sistema dei controlli interni, sistema informative e continuità operativa. Relazione 
sull’analisi d’impatto, (June, 2013). 
6 Circolare n. 263 di Banca d’Italia (Dicembre 2006). In the first issue, the internal audit guidelines 
were shown in the Title I, Section 4, “La gestione e il controllo dei rischi. Ruolo degli organi 
aziendali”, pp. 23-27. These guidelines were abrogated in correspondence with the 15th update of 
Circolare n. 263. 
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monitoring proxy is carried out; chapter n. 3 concerns the empirical analyses referred 
to the bank efficiency estimates obtained through the stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA) and the assessment of the relationship between profit efficiency and loan 
monitoring proxy; chapter n. 4 regards the empirical analyses conducted on the 
relationship between banking supervision and its efficiency, chapter n. 5 summarises 
the preliminary conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Preliminary Conclusions 
5.1) The Main Findings 
 
In the current research, the role played by the financial intermediaries during the 
crisis and how they could contribute to the economic growth was investigated. 
Using an “innovative measure”, i.e. Granular Residual (Gabaix 2011) presents in 
literature, the research shows how the lending growth in the Italian banking system 
could be related to the economic environment. In particular, the results show the 
existence of a relationship between the contributions of each bank (in term of loans 
growth) to the economic environment. This contribution, without taking into account 
any banks’ control variables, explains how a variation of one unit in terms of loans 
growth could improve, approximately, 1,9% the banks’ efficiency and 2,5% both the 
banks’ efficiency and GDP growth. Moreover, splitting up the analysis with respect 
to the types of banks present in the Italian banking system, their contributions are 
characterised by a negative relationship for commercial banks (Banche S.p.A.) and a 
positive relationship for mutual banks (Banche diCredito Cooperativo). 
All in all, the economic interpretations, given in the current chapter, are only partials, 
since, firstly, this kind of analysis is only at its first stage, and secondly, because the 
current research uses only a few variables, reducing therefore the likelihood to find 
other and more interesting empirical results.  
However, the role played by financial institutions during the whole financial crisis 
and the role they will play in the future, represents the starting point of several 
hypotheses and empirical evidences, in order to find, evermore, links between the 
financial environment and real and social economy, since the financial sector 
constitutes the main link between monetary policy and the real economy (Draghi 
2013). 
In addition, the advice, about “how bankers should behave or be made to behave” 
(Schumpeter, 1939), mirrors the necessity to intensify and to investigate the 
resources that banks devote to the monitoring activity. Bank monitoring, in addition, 
is considered, in academic literature, as one of the primary sources of value creation 
(Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Rajan, 
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1992; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 1995). On the other hand, 
loan losses are considered as a remarkable determinant of bank profitability. 
Therefore, bank monitoring, together with bank profitability, shed light on bankers’ 
awareness about the relationship between loan losses and net income. In so doing, 
the effort to avoid significant and unexpected losses, spurs the necessity on assuming 
one of the largest commitments of employee resources for the lending function: i.e. 
salaries expressed in terms of “highly educated and high-salaried employees” 
(Akhigbe and McNulty, 2011). 
This research develops a preliminary proxy variables based on labour input into the 
monitoring process in order to investigate the resources devoted by banks to their 
monitoring activity of loans. The monitoring proxy, estimated through fixed-effects 
regressions on 436 Italian banks from 2000 to 2011, shows that a superior 
monitoring effort improves future loan losses experience through the early detection 
and management of problem loans. In greater detail, this relation suggests how 
superior monitoring effort has a positive influence on the future loans quality. In 
particular, a more robust monitoring activity ought to emphaise its economic 
benefits. In accordance with Coleman et al. (2006) and Akhigbe and McNulty 
(2011), the relationship is negative, as would be expected, and it is significant at the 
1% level. 
Furthermore, in order to broaden out the analysis, the relationship between 
Monitoring Effort and the variation occurred in the loans’ quality regarding each 
kind of bank present in the Italian banking system (commercial, cooperative and 
mutual banks) has been conducted. By taking the value of unity for the 68 
commercial, 25 cooperative and 343 mutual banks respectively, cooperative banks, 
together with mutual ones, it emphasises a negative and statistical significant, at 1% 
level, with the loans’ quality variation. 
In order to investigate whether increased monitoring effort affects efficiency, the 
monitoring proxies are inserted into a standard linear regression equation, this latter 
estimated through a Tobit regression in which, the dependent variable is the profit 
efficiency coefficient determined by the stochastic frontier approach. The monitoring 
proxies are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, which supports the 
hypothesis that monitoring increases profit efficiency. Particularly, regarding the 
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Italian banking system as a whole, if the monitoring effort increases by 1%, then it 
would expect profit efficiency to increase by 81,68% in terms of net interest margin, 
and by 97,63% in terms of financial outcome. In greater detail, the monitoring effort 
of commercial banks, would seem to decrease by 6,76% the financial outcome 
efficiency components. Cooperative banks show the same relationship, the latter 
characterised by 4,72% decrease in terms of financial intermediation efficiency 
components. Completely different are the estimations obtained with regard to mutual 
banks. The latter, besides keeping the relationship with the entire banking system, 
increasing by 1% their monitoring activities, would expect to increase by 4,63 net 
interest margin efficiency component and to increase by 8,84% financial outcome 
efficiency component. 
Although these results are confirmed in academic literature by other authors 
(Coleman et al. 2006; Akhigbe and McNulty 2011), their economic interpretation 
must be considered as preliminary and under development. 
Moreover, by estimating the effect of economic sanctions on profit efficiency, the 
latter expressed as net interest margin, intermediation margin and financial outcome, 
the results have emphasised that, the more economic sanctions are inflicted, the less 
the efficiency of the production process will be. In particular, the coefficients 
estimated emphasise that if economic sanctions increase by one unit, then it would 
expect profit efficiency to decrease by 0,38% and 0,43% in 2012 and 2011 
respectively, regarding the net interest margin; by 0,28% and 0,27% in 2012 and 
2011 respectively, regarding the intermediation margin; by 0,3% and 0,27% in 2012 
and 2011 respectively, regarding the financial outcome. 
In so doing, the underlying hypothesis, with which economic sanctions inflicted by 
the Bank of Italy could negatively affect the efficiency level of bank production 
process, has implemented in the Italian banking system.89 
 
 
 
                                           
89 However, these results ought to be considered preliminary and under development. 
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5.2) The Advantages of an “ex-ante” proxy developed 
 
The contribution of the current research relies on the possibility to introduce an “ex-
ante” proxy of the monitoring effort based on the resources that a bank devotes to 
loan screening and monitoring (in terms of labour input into the monitoring process). 
The total amount of resources, which a bank devotes to monitoring its loans 
customer, is not reported in the income statement. Besides occupying a remarkable 
place in the academic literature (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; 
Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Rajan, 1992; Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 
1994; 1995), bank monitoring is one of the main sources of value creation. 
Therefore, a preliminary advantage of the current study relies on the ex-ante proxy of 
the monitoring ability rather than ex-post measures such as credit ratings, loan losses 
or, alternatively, bank size (Billett et al. 1995; Cook et al. 2003). In so doing, as the 
monitoring ability of a bank is not directly observable, an ex-ante proxy of 
monitoring was developed by taking into account the quantity and quality of the 
bank staff, i.e. the ratio of salary expense to total non-interest expense (Coleman et 
al. 2006; Akhigbe and McNulty, 2011). The aim of this ratio is to capture both the 
quantity and quality of staff employed in monitoring and to provide an overall 
measure of the monitoring effort. 
5.3) The Limitations 
 
The main weaknesses, in the current research, could be related to the “ex-ante” 
approach to determining the bank monitoring proxy, the peculiar sample adopted (i.e. 
Italian banking system) and the time period (2012-cross section90) taken into account 
to developing the profit efficiency function. 
The “ex-ante” approach, together with the econometric analysis, could not be 
objective concerning the explanatory variables (i.e. the independent variables chosen 
in the fixed-effects regression) and the different characteristics among banks (i.e. 
commercial banks (S.p.A.), cooperative banks (Popolari) and mutual banks (Banche 
                                           
90 The restricted time period (year 2012) depends on the information published by ABI Banking Data. 
The latter, in particular, during the research activities, made the 2012 balance sheets and income 
statements as latest year available for the entire Italian banking system. 
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di Credito Cooperativo)). In order to overcome them, control variables, together with 
robust standard error and interactive variables were introduced in each econometric 
model. 
Moreover, the time period, considered for the efficiency estimates, is rather 
restricted. A deeper analysis, with more years, could consider the stochastic frontier 
approach through panel data, in order to take into account the decay inefficient 
component along the years. In addition, a wider time period could lead to a more 
meticulous analysis and to a more robust empirical investigation. 
5.4) Direction for Future Research 
 
The current research, regarding the role of the bank monitoring effort into the Italian 
banking system, highlights the need for additional research and suggests some 
directions in which this research might proceed. 
Within Schumpeter’s (1939) perspective, financing of enterprise has been assigned 
logical priority, in the sense that, this is the only case in which lending and the ad 
hoc creation of means of payment are essential elements of an economic process. On 
the other hand, within bank perspective, the lending process needs to rely on a 
remarkable commitment of employee resources. In particular, this commitment (i.e. 
personnel expense) mirrors the high educated and high-salaried employees to the 
bank lending process (Akhigbe and McNulty, 2011). Moreover, the idea, which 
loans to entrepreneurs need not be repaid, but can be, and often are, renewed in such 
a way as to make the corresponding amount of means of payment permanently part 
of the circulating medium (Schumpeter, 1939), sheds light on the remarkable human 
capital monitoring effort. The series of activities employed by staff in the lending 
iter, such as credit analysts, requires ad hoc skills together with a well-defined job 
description since their jobs demand in depth knowledge and experience. 
In so doing, a direction for future research ought to consider the parallel between the 
policies applied in the euro area with the idea of “creative destruction”91 driving 
innovation and productivity growth. In a disequilibria environment, caused by 
innovation, other firms will have to undertake investments, which cannot be financed 
                                           
91 Joseph Schumpeter. 
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from current receipts, and become borrowers also. Furthermore, whenever the 
evolutionary process is in full swing, the bulk of bank credit, outstanding at any time, 
finances what has become current business and has lost it original contact with 
innovation or with the adaptive operations induced by innovations, although the 
history of every loan must lead back to one or the other.92 
A well-functioning financial sector for the efficient allocation of capital and credit 
together with the Schumpeterian notion of “creative destruction” represent the 
necessary resources to flow to the firms that use them most productively (Draghi, 
2014).93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
92 Ibidem note 91. 
93 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the presentation ceremony of 
the Schumpeter Award, Central Bank of the Republic of Austria, Vienna, 13th March 2014. 
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